The nub of the furore is that despite branding Abid Naseer and Ahmed Faraz Khan as people "who posed and still poses a serious threat to the national security of the United Kingdom they could not be deported to their native Pakistan because there was a risk that they would face torture, something that would contravene their rights under Article 3 of the ECHR.
Almost immediately, there have been calls to review the Human Rights Act 1998 which is the piece of legislation which embodies the ECHR in law in England and Wales but this is to slightly miss the point. Nobody can seriously contest that a prohibition on torture - yes, even that of Al-Qaeda members - is in itself wrong. Equally, it is empty to try and argue that whilst we may not sign up to torture in the UK, it is acceptable to put someone currently in the care of the authorities in a position where there is an appreciable chance that they may be tortured.
Rather, this is an opportunity for us to look at what we do when we are faced with the, none too rare, event of someone who is a danger to the UK but who originates in a country to which they cannot be deported; we should be looking at the alternatives rather than trying to rewrite what is broadly the right thing in statute.
The options are slim. As Shami Chakrabarti argues in today's Times one of the options is to charge Naseer and Khan with offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 and, if found guilty, they would then serve custodial sentences thus mitigating the need to worry about extradition. On the face of it, this is attractive and would certainly be the right thing in normal circumstances, but that's not the case here. The SIAC judgement makes it clear that the evidence was strongly in the direction that the appellants were 'guilty' of being involved in terrorism. The problem is that this conclusion could only be reached after assessing the body of evidence which was closed; ie information from MI5 and the Police that was so sensitive it couldn't be made open in court.
That means that any prosecution along Shami Chakrabarti's lines, could not go ahead; no evidence could be brought before the court upon which a judgement as to guilt or innocence could be made.
So we're left with something akin to a Control Order as an alternative, something that the House of Lords have signalled they are unhappy with as a mechanism to deal with these things, or release of known Al Qaeda members into the community - equally undesirable. So where do we go now?
The first thing we don't do is waste time worrying about the HRA 1998 and any possible improvement via a British Bill of Rights; both are valid points, but not for today. Natural justice dictates that Mr Justice Milling was right in his conclusion about the impossibility of deportation but that same natural justice requires the point about the appellant's danger to the UK to be addressed by judicial authorities. Look at it this way; the rights of the appellants are satisfied by not being deported, the rights of the wider public to expect protection from people such as the appellants now needs addressing.
There are examples, such as the Court of Protection and even the High Court sitting in camera in relation to the recent 'jury nobbling trial' where Courts can impose a raft of restrictions upon their openness and upon who exactly can see evidence related to the issues. None of these are perfect; all have lacuna's of fairness and gaps in openness and accountability. But when that is balanced against the alternatives; acknowledged terrorists, free to walk the streets, it seems a price worth at least investigating.
Longer term, we need to properly look at the situation regarding disclosure of evidence from the Security Services in cases such as this. They now need to look at their own balancing act; if they were able to disclose more of their evidential case in court, they could secure the prosecution - a la Shami Chakrabarti's argument - of terrorist suspects. If they don't, we are back where we are now.
We need to review how we handle these cases but the answer probably rests more in evidential barriers and systems of holding hearings in camera, rather than the more headline grabbing ideas connected with the Human Rights Act.